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Abstract
Motivated by reasons such as altruism, managers from different hospitals may engage in coop-
erative behaviours, which shape the networked healthcare economy. In this paper we study the de-
terminants of hospital cooperation and its association with the quality delivered by hospitals, using
Italian administrative data. We explore the impact on patient transfers between hospitals (coopera-
tion/network) of a set of demand-supply factors, as well as distance-based centrality measures. We
then use this framework to assess how such cooperation is related to the overall quality for the hospital
of origin and of destination of the patient transfer. The over-dispersed Poisson mixed model that we
propose, inspired by the literature on social relations models, is suitably defined to handle network
data, which are rarely used in health economics. The results show that distance plays an important
role in hospital cooperation, though there are other factors that matter such as geographical centrality.
Another empirical finding is the existence of a positive relationship between hospital cooperation and
the overall quality of the connected hospitals. The absence of a source of information on the quality
of hospitals accessible to all providers, such as in the form of star ratings, may prevent some hospitals
to engage and cooperate with other hospitals of potentially higher quality. This may result in a lower
degree of cooperation among hospitals and a reduction in quality overall.
Keywords: hospital cooperation, patient flows, social relation model, healthcare quality
1 Introduction
In recent years, several central and local governments in Western countries such as the UK and Italy,
have implemented pro-competition reforms in their healthcare sectors with the view that, as predicted
by the economic theory, more competition among hospitals, when prices are regulated, would lead to
improvements in the quality of healthcare services, ultimately having a positive impact on the health
outcomes of the population. While there has been a wide and alive debate among health economists on
the effects of competition on hospital quality (Berta et al., 2016; Chone´, 2017; Colla et al., 2016; Mascia
et al., 2017; Mukamel et al., 2002; Gaynor, 2006; Gaynor et al., 2017; Propper et al., 2004), little is
known on cooperative behaviours among healthcare providers, and their effects on health outcomes. The
question whether cooperation exists is important. If it does, we first need to understand the mechanisms
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underlying cooperation and then whether it has a positive, a null or even a negative effect on hospital
quality.
Why should economic agents cooperate? Economists have addressed this question with game theory,
starting with the example of the prisoner dilemma to more complex dynamic games that find their appli-
cations in different areas of applied economics such as trade. Similarly, in the healthcare sector doctors,
economic actors such as nurses, or managers may decide under certain rules, strategies, and payoffs, to
cooperate rather than to act independently. Managers from different hospitals, who are motivated by rea-
sons such as convenience or altruism, may decide to cooperate, with the aim of improving efficiency and
health outcomes of their respective organizations (Gittell and Weiss, 2004; Mascia et al., 2012). Such
cooperation can take various forms, ranging from merging facilities to clinical network information shar-
ing, joint treatment or joint diagnostic centres, new shared assets and joint construction of new facilities.
Informal cooperation between healthcare providers may also take place. This occurs for example when
we observe the existence of a network between professionals, healthcare providers or the management
boards of different hospitals (Westra et al., 2017). For example, physicians from any two hospitals may
collaborate when treating a patient, thus creating correlations in health indicators across hospitals (Westra
et al., 2016). However, these networks tend to predominate within rather than between hospitals (Barnett
et al., 2011; Landon et al., 2012; Pollack et al., 2012).
In this paper, we study the informal network that is generated among healthcare providers when a patient
is transferred across hospitals. Under the assumption that hospital managers are altruistic agents, hospitals
decide to transfer patients to other hospitals when the benefits of transfer outweigh the risks. While the
decision to transfer a patient is usually driven by the availability of specialized care in the hospital of
origin and destination, the choice of the destination hospital may be driven, among other things, by
its geographical proximity, demand-supply factors of the hospital of origin and destination, as well as
the relative quality of the hospital of origin with respect the hospital of destination. However, hospital
managers in some countries may not know the distribution of quality across the other hospitals in the
healthcare sector, thus their choice will be driven by a measure of perceived relative quality. This source
of asymmetric information may produce different effects: if the relative perceived quality is reflecting the
relative “true quality”, we should expect that cooperation will improve overall health outcomes of both
hospital of origin and destination. However, if the relative perceived quality is negatively associated with
the relative “true quality”, cooperation may even harm patients in both hospitals. Policy makers may
have a strong interest in understanding the drivers underlying these cooperation networks in order to be
able to design effective policy interventions, as well as identifying healthcare provider links that actually
improve the health outcome of the transferred patient.
In this paper we study the determinants of hospital cooperation and its association with the quality de-
livered by the networking hospitals. We first explore the impact on patient transfers between hospitals
(cooperation network) of a set of demand-supply factors, as well as centrality measures from the network
of geographical distances, including factors related to hospital quality. The decision of including qual-
ity in the manager’s hospital transfer choice is coherent with our context whereby policy makers know
the distribution of adjusted quality across the territory, and this information is partially revealed to the
hospital managers, as explained further in Section 3. On the other hand, in order to study the effects of
cooperation (patient transfer) on overall quality for the hospital of origin and of destination, the first stage
will be estimated after excluding hospital quality and all the variables possibly correlated with it, since
real patient transfer flows can be influenced by hospital quality if the decision of the referring hospital is
based, among other things, on the relative quality of the destination hospital. Such endogeneity may bias
results when regressing the transfers on health outcomes.
Following the literature on social relations models (Warner et al., 1979; Hoff, 2005), we adopt an over-
dispersed Poisson mixed model that is suitable to handle network data. These statistical models are
rarely used in health economics and health research in general. We use data on hospital discharges for
over 900,000 patients admitted to 145 hospitals in the Lombardy region (Italy) in 2014. Among these
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patients, around 15,500 (1.7%) were transferred to other hospitals after admission. Our results show that
geographical distance plays an important role in hospital cooperation, although there are also other factors
that matter, such as the geographical centrality of a hospital. Another empirical finding is the existence
of a positive relationship between hospital cooperation and the overall clinical quality for the hospital of
origin and of destination.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the determinants of
patient flows and the impact of cooperation on hospital quality. Section 3 describes the data, introducing
the Italian NHS and the Lombardy healthcare system, which is the focus of our empirical investigation.
Section 4 undertakes an exploratory data analysis of networks of transfers. Section 5 estimates patient
flows via an over-dispersed Poisson mixed models. Section 6 estimates the impact of cooperation on the
hospital quality. Section 7 makes some concluding remarks and plans for future work.
2 Literature background
The basis for modelling patient flows across geographical locations is the gravity model (Silva and Ten-
reyro, 2006), which involves a “mass” term for both the origin and destination units, and incorporates the
impact of geographical distance. There exists a strand of literature in health economics that uses the grav-
ity model to investigate the determinants of patient flows at regional, Local Health Authority (LHA) or
hospital/ward level (Levaggi and Zanola, 2004; Shinjo and Aramaki, 2012; Congdon, 2001; Balia et al.,
2018; Cantarero, 2006; Fabbri and Robone, 2010; Mascia et al., 2012). For example, Balia et al. (2018)
adopt a gravity model to investigate the determinants of patient mobility among Italian regions for the
period 2001-2010 using data on hospital discharges. The authors find that income, hospital capacity and
the regional technological level are the key drivers of patient regional flows. Congdon (2001), using data
on emergency units in 127 electoral wards in North East London and Essex, finds patient age and the
travel distance to be the main drivers to patient flows. In general, regardless of the level of aggregation
of the data used, these studies find that the most important variables explaining patient transfers are: ge-
ographical distance between healthcare providers, patient characteristics, the capacity of hospitals, the
availability of medical technologies, and the quality of health services.
There is an emerging interest in studying the determinants of patient hospital transfers by adopting a net-
work analysis approach. Some authors have summarised the network in the form of centrality measures,
some others have modelled directly the presence of an edge between two hospitals, i.e. a cooperation
between two hospitals. In particular, Lomi and Pallotti (2012) and Caimo et al. (2017) use exponential
random graph models to link the tendency of hospitals to cooperate with hospital characteristics and a
set of network summary statistics, such as the density of the network, the presence of mutual edges, or
reciprocity, and of triads. Using administrative data for 91 hospitals located in the Lazio region (Italy), the
authors find that hospitals’ proximity and sharing an administrative membership facilitate cooperation.
Furthermore, they find the presence of local networks, with the tendency to reciprocity among hospitals.
Differently from the works cited above, Mascia et al. (2015) studies the effect of patient transfers, and
particularly of the topological properties of the network of flows, on hospital quality. The authors adopt
a multilevel model approach to describe the impact of measures of centrality and ego-network density
of the network of transfers on readmissions within 45-days after the discharge. Using administrative
data for 31 hospitals in the region of Abruzzo (Italy), they find that greater network centrality, in the
form of hospitals with many flows with other hospitals who are also central, is negatively associated
with readmissions, whereas greater ego-network density, represented by a high sharing of patients among
hospitals that are connected to a central hospital, increases the likelihood of readmissions, thus reducing
the quality provided.
The works reviewed above have contributed to identifying the determinants of cooperation between hos-
pitals, and will be used in Section 5 as a guidance to specify our empirical model. In particular, we will
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model cooperation between hospitals by including demand-supply variables, hospital quality, geographi-
cal distance as well as distance-based centrality measures that account for spatial correlation in the data.
Further, similarly to Mascia et al. (2015), we will consider mortality rate as well as readmissions as health
outcomes, but we perform the analysis on a different Italian region (Lombardy) and across a larger num-
ber of hospitals (145). In contrast to Mascia et al. (2015), however, we also consider the fact that quality
may be a contributing factor in the decision of a hospital to transfer a patient to a different hospital, and
we therefore opt for a two-stage approach.
3 Data
The Italian National Healthcare System (NHS) follows the Beveridge model (Beveridge et al., 1942),
providing universal healthcare coverage throughout the country as a single payer. It entitles all citizens,
regardless of their social status, to equal access to essential healthcare services. In 1992, a system reform
transferred administrative and organizational responsibilities and tasks from the central government to the
administrations of the 21 regions in Italy. These regions now have significant autonomy on the revenue
side and in organizing services designed to meet the needs of their respective populations.
The Lombardy healthcare system was reformed in 1997 becoming a quasi-market system made up of
both public and private providers which are reimbursed by a prospective payment system based on Di-
agnosis Related Groups (DRGs) (Brenna, 2011; Berta et al., 2010, 2013). The reimbursement provided
to the hospitals for each discharge is defined according to specific DRG tariffs, revised every year by the
regional government on the basis of increasing costs due to the introduction of new medical technologies
and also taking into account the introduction of new policies. These public regional reimbursements rep-
resent the majority of revenues for acute discharges in all hospitals located in Lombardy. The Lombardy
healthcare system yearly provides the results on hospital quality on a web portal in which hospitals can
access and see their performance rankings with respect to other hospitals within the region. The regional
health authority provides a hospital classification into three groups depending on whether the quality is
significantly above, not different, or significantly below the regional average performance. Along this in-
formation, managers may hold informal information on the quality of hospitals; this is the reason of why
in Section 5 we will control for hospital quality when studying the impact on patient transfers between
hospitals (cooperation/network).
In this paper, we analyse data gathered from the administrative regional healthcare information system,
which includes information on patients discharged from 145 hospitals accredited with the regional health-
care system in the Lombardy region (Italy) in the year 2014. The dataset contains 1,541,996 hospitaliza-
tions, of which 84% were ordinary and 16% were in day hospital or day surgery. Furthermore, hospital-
izations of patients living outside the Lombardy region accounted for 10% of all admissions. The hospital
discharge data contains demographic information such as age and gender, information on hospitalization
(length of stay, special-care unit use, transfers within the same hospital or through other facilities, and
within-hospital mortality), and a total of 6 diagnosis codes and surgical procedures defined according
to the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM). Only
ordinary hospitalizations for patients aged more than 2 years were retained in the sample. We define a
transfer between hospitals by a patient discharged from a hospital and then admitted in another hospital
on the same day or the next one (Iwashyna et al., 2009). In order to exclude any patient involvement in
this process, we exclude voluntary discharges. Finally, we define mortality by the death of the patient in
hospital, or within 30 days after the discharge, and we define readmission by a patient readmission within
45-days after the discharge and for the same major diagnostic class. Table 1 provides a set of descriptive
statistics on health outcomes and patient and hospital characteristics, split by hospital ownership (private
and public). Around 45% of the hospitals are private, although they only cover 28% of the hospitaliza-
tions. It is interesting to observe that, while patient demographic characteristics (age and gender) are
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the patient and hospital data, for the variables that will be used in
subsequent models. Information is split by hospital ownership.
Private Hospitals Public Hospitals Overall
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Outcomes
Mortality rate 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04
Readmission rate 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.04
Patient Characteristics
Female (F) 0.51 0.08 0.56 0.10 0.54 0.10
Age (A) 64.38 7.00 61.03 7.41 62.37 7.41
DRG Weight (DW) 1.24 0.27 1.10 0.21 1.16 0.24
Hospitals Characteristics
Beds Saturation (BS) 61.12 20.55 79.24 10.30 71.99 17.60
Beds Turnover (BT) 40.10 11.43 40.98 8.25 40.63 9.62
Distance in minutes (D) 59.60 15.89 66.83 21.43 63.94 19.67
# Hospitals 58 87 145
# Transfers 3,024 12,492 15,516
# Hospital Discharges (HD) 256,909 643,242 900,151
similar for private and public hospitals, their case-mix is quite different, with private hospitals having a
higher DRG weight. In terms of health outcomes, we observe that gross rates are higher in public hospi-
tals compared to the private, with a small difference for readmissions and a bigger gap for mortality. This
is not directly related with the quality provided by the two types of providers, but it is more related with
the different case-mix of patients admitted in public and private hospitals. In terms of hospital character-
istics, the table reports the beds saturation index, or occupancy rate, which is measured by the average
number of days when a hospital bed is occupied as a percentage of the available 365 days, and the beds
turnover index, which is a measure of the extent of beds’ utilization and is measured by the number of
changes in bed occupancy during the year. The statistics show that, while public hospitals are on average
bigger than private ones and with a higher saturation index, the turnover index is similar between private
and public hospitals. Finally, looking at the distance between hospitals, which is measured by the travel
time between any two hospitals, the table shows how public hospitals tend to be on average slightly more
distant (approximately 7 minutes more) than private ones. These variables will be used in the models
presented in the next sections.
4 Exploratory analysis of the network of transfers
As discussed in the introduction, we measure hospital cooperation using the network of patient transfers.
In this network each hospital in Lombardy is a node and the edges are the connections between two
hospitals with a weight defined by the number of patient transfers between the two hospitals. Table 1
reports the total number of transfers, split by hospital ownership. In Table 2 we further describe the
network of transfers using various measures of network centrality from the network modelling literature
(Kolaczyk and Csa´rdi, 2014), but also considered in the literature of patient flows (Ferna´ndez-Gracia
et al., 2017). In particular we consider the in-centrality of the network, which is based on the in-degrees
of all nodes in the network, i.e. the number of hospitals from which a given hospital receives transferred
patients. Similarly, the out-centrality measures the number of hospitals to which patients are transferred
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the network of patient flows.
Overall Private Hospitals Public Hospitals
In-Centrality 5.0633 2.4328 6.3969
In-Closeness 0.0976 0.0299 0.2061
In-Strength 0.4454 0.3771 0.4053
Betweenness 0.1390 0.1499 0.1385
Out-Centrality 2.9730 1.6258 3.3388
Out-Closeness 0.0249 0.0170 0.2033
Out-Strength 0.3273 0.2017 0.4053
# Hospitals 58 87 145
from a given hospital, across all nodes. The in- and out-strength indices further consider the weights
associated to each edge, i.e. the number of patients received/transferred by a hospital. In addition,
we calculate the closeness of the network, indicating the proximity of each node with the other nodes in
terms of the number of steps needed to go from a hospital to the transferring/receiving hospital. Similarly,
betweenness quantifies the number of times a hospital is a bridge for the other hospitals in the network.
Each measure is calculated using the centr degree function in the igraph R package (Csa´rdi and
Nepusz, 2006), from which normalized scores are automatically calculated which are comparable across
graphs of different sizes. The results are presented in Table 2 for the overall network, as well as for the
two sub-networks of private-only and public-only hospitals. Overall, the results appear to show how the
network is rather centralized and how there is a higher tendency for nodes to have a large in-degree (i.e.
receiving from many other hospitals) than out-degree. In addition, it appears that the network of public
hospitals has more central nodes/hubs than the network of private hospitals.
Aside from centrality measures and with a view to finding determinants of patient flows, we next consider
approaches to identify possible structures in the network, for example in the form of partitions of the
network where nodes belonging to the same partition are strongly connected among them and sparsely
connected with the nodes belonging to different partitions. To this aim, the network of transfers has
been analyzed using a community detection method. In particular we consider the method by Blondel
et al. (2008), which is highlighted by Yang et al. (2016) in their comparative study and where partitions
are searched based on improvements of the modularity score. Figure 1 shows the optimal partition for
the network of transfers, obtained using the multilevel.community function in the igraph R
package (Csa´rdi and Nepusz, 2006). The figure shows a strong relationship between the modularity-
detected communities and their geographical location. Nine communities are detected and most of them
correspond to specific municipalities in Lombardy (e.g. Pavia, Lodi and Bergamo correspond to the
orange, red and green communities, respectively ). The metropolitan area of Milan, where the most part of
the hospitals are located, is characterized by three different communities: the eastern part of Milan shares
the community with the municipality of Monza-Brianza (black dots), the western part shares the hospitals
with the community of Varese (yellow dots), whereas the central part identifies one single community
(blue dots). Finally two more communities are identified: one that is characterized by the presence of the
mountains in the north and include the municipalities of Sondrio, Como and Lecco (purple dots) and the
second one which is characterized by the eastern part of the region and is shared by the municipality of
Cremona, Mantua and Brescia (azure dots). The community detection approach has shown how both the
distance between hospitals and the belonging to the same Local Health Authorities (LHS), are substantial
factors in defining the network of hospital transfers. This finding is consistent with the literature (Lomi
and Pallotti, 2012; Mascia et al., 2012; Caimo et al., 2017). On the basis of this explorative analysis, we
will include both distance and co-memberships to LHAs as determinants of patient transfers in the next
analysis. For that purpose, it is also important to emphasize that these determinants are exogenous to the
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Figure 1: Maps of the hospitals in Lombardy and their belonging to the communities detected based on
modularity. Each of the 9 detected communities is assigned a different colour. The map also shows the
borders between different municipalities.
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quality of hospitals.
5 Modelling patient flows via an over-dispersed Poisson mixed model
In order to predict the network of patient transfers from a number of exogenous determinants, we resort to
the literature on social relations models (Warner et al., 1979), where the statistical dependencies inherent
in dyadic data are carefully considered and accounted for. This results in a general class of mixed effect
models, where random effects are included in order to control for node effects, which are typical of
network data where multiple observations relate to the same node/edge. These models, not considered in
the healthcare literature before, but known in the network modelling literature (Hoff, 2005), have been
implemented in the amen R package using a Bayesian inferential approach (Hoff et al., 2017). Since the
dependent variable in our study is discrete, we will extend the existing implementations to the case of an
over-dispersed Poisson mixed model.
Going to the details of the model, let Tij be the number of transfers between hospital i and j. Since the
data is in the form of a network, statistical dependencies are to be expected, for example the fact that data
associated to the same hospital of origin i (i.e. a row of the matrix of transfers) or to the same destination
hospital j (i.e. a column of the matrix of transfers) may be more similar to each other than to the rest of
the observations. We model these dependencies using the mixed model
E(Tij |·) = exp(α+ β1HDi + β2HDj + ζ1DWi + ζ2DWj + γ1Ai + γ2Aj + δ1Fi + δ2Fj+
+ η1DCi + η2DCj + θ1BWi + θ2BWj + ϑ1Teachi + ϑ2Teachj+
+ λ1Monoi + λ2Monoj + %1Technoi + %2Technoj+
+ κ1BSi + κ2BSj + τ1BTi + τ2BTj + ω1AMj + ω2AMj + φ1ARj + φ2ARj+
+ ξDij + ψCMij + εij), (1)
where the errors have the following dependency structure
εij =ai + bj + νij
(ai, bi)
′ ∼MVN(0,Σab), Σab =
(
σ2a σab
σab σ
2
b
)
,
(νij , νji)
′ ∼MVN(0,Σν), Σν = σ2ν
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)
,
with ai and bj , i, j = 1, . . . , N , the random effects for the sender and receiver hospitals, respectively, and
νij the errors. This model induces a covariance among the εij given by:
E(ε2ij) = σ
2
a + σ
2
b + σ
2
ν , E(εijεik) = σ
2
a,
E(εijεji) = ρσ
2
ν + 2σab, E(εijεkj) = σ
2
b ,
E(εijεkl) = 0, E(εijεki) = σab.
That is, σ2a represents the correlation of observations having a common hospital sender, whereas σ
2
b
defines the dependence of observations having a common hospital receiver. Since the network is asym-
metric, ρ measures the “reciprocity” between sender and receiver hospitals, that is the dyadic correlation
between the number of transfers from i to j and those from j to i. In addition, σ2ν accounts for over-
dispersion: when σ2ν is zero, the model is a simple Poisson mixed model, whereas when σ
2
ν increases, the
conditional variance of Tij becomes larger than the mean.
Several covariates are included in the model in Equation (1), both at the node and at the dyadic level.
In line with the literature (Mascia et al., 2012, 2015) we include in the model the dyadic covariates of
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geographical distance between two hospitals (D) and their co-membership (CM), an indicator variable
identifying if the two hospitals belong to the same LHA. We also control for the degree centrality (DC)
of both origin (i) and destination (j) hospital. This is measured based on a geographical network where
two hospitals are linked if they are less than 30 minutes of effective time travel apart. This variable allows
to adjust the predictions for the hospitals’ concentration in a pre-defined space, the hypothesis being that
a higher value of this index for the origin hospital indicates a wider choice set for the hospital that needs
to decide where to transfer a patient, and similarly for the destination hospital. We also include in the
model the betweenness index (BW ), calculated for each node of the geographical network and rescaled
to a minimum of zero and a maximum of one. In terms of hospital or node-based characteristics, we
control for the number of discharges of both the sender and receiver hospitals (HD) as well as for the
severity of patients treated in a hospital. For the latter, we include both the variable DRG Weight (DW ),
taken also as a measure of resources that the hospital employs to treat patients (Berta et al., 2013), and
the patient age (A), measured as an average at the hospital level. Similarly, we control for the patient
hospital mix in terms of gender composition by including in the model the percentage of female patients
in a hospital (F ). Furthermore, we include specific hospital characteristics for both sender and receiver
hospitals which identify if the hospital is a teaching hospital or not (Teach), if it is a monospecialized or
a general hospital (Mono) and if the hospital is highly equipped or not in terms of technology (Techno).
Finally, we include hospital beds saturation and hospital beds turnover indices, in order to measure the
beds capacity of a hospital and the efficiency in using beds (Lomi et al., 2014; Mascia et al., 2017), and
two variables measuring the hospital quality: adjusted mortality (AM ) and adjusted 45-days readmissions
(AR).
We estimate the model in Equation 1 via a Bayesian MCMC algorithm, adapting the implementation in
the ame function of the amen R-package (Hoff et al., 2017) to the case of a Poisson distributed dependent
variable. We use a burn-in window of 1000 iterations, followed by 10000 iterations, where we save the
estimated parameters every 25th iteration. Table 3 shows the posterior mean estimates of the parameters.
The variable geographical distance shows that the shorter the distance between two hospitals the higher
the number of transfers. This was to be expected from our earlier exploratory analysis (Figure 1), despite
the high density of hospitals in Lombardy. Similarly, as expected, the co-membership of the hospitals
to the same LHA increases the patient flows between hospitals. These associations are reported also by
other studies (Caimo et al., 2017; Landon et al., 2012; Mascia et al., 2012) and explained by the fact
that low distance in the transfer of a patient is typically prefered by hospitals in order to reduce the
costs for travelling and the risks for the patient associated to the transfers. The positive and significant
relationship between the degree centrality and the transfers indicates that when the set of opportunities
for transferring/receiving patients increases, the hospitals tend to transfer/receive more patients. In order
to check the robustness of this result, we have repeated the analysis using degree centrality indices based
on several thresholds of the distances (between 20 and 40 minutes). We have observed a correlation of
over 0.90 among the predicted values across these different thresholds, suggesting a robustness of this
finding. Further, adjusting for hospital discharges proves to be important when explaining variation in
patient flows.
With regards to patient characteristics, the analysis suggests that the demographic characteristics of the
average patient in a hospital, such as age and gender, do not have a significant impact on the number of
patient transfers, whereas the severity of their conditions and the ability of the hospitals in managing beds
have a significant impact on the number of patient transfers. In terms of other hospital characteristics, we
find that being a destination teaching hospital increases the transfers, and, similarly, being a technological
hospital is positively related with the transfers for both origin and destination hospitals. This might sug-
gest that hospitals with a low level of technology move complicated patients to the technological hospital
in order to provide for example a cardiosurgical intervention, but when the patients overcome the critical
post-surgical phase, they are likely to be moved back to the previous hospital. In this way, the patient
receives necessary assistance, releasing the bed in the technological hospital for a new hospitalization. Fi-
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Figure 2: Posterior predictive goodness of fit for the model in equation (1).
Row Effect
0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64
Column Effect
0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98
Dyadic Effect
0.48 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58
nally, the variables attached to hospital quality do not seem to play a role in explaining patient flows, most
likely due to the fact that hospital managers in the Lombardy Region do not fully know the distribution
of quality across the healthcare system.
The inference also provides a quantification of the level of dependencies in the data: in particular, the
relatively large value of the parameter ρ suggests a high correlation of the two observations associated to
an edge in the network and thus a high level of reciprocity between connected hospitals. The same can be
said for σ2a and σ
2
b , whose large values suggest the presence of row and column effects. These findings
support the need for the use of more advanced mixed effect models in our study.
A number of checks were further conducted to measure the goodness of fit of the model. To this aim,
we compared some suitably defined summary statistics of the observed network with the same statistics
calculated from the predicted network generated at each iteration of the MCMC algorithm. In particular,
we consider three network statistics from a given network: (1) the standard deviation of the row means;
(2) the standard deviation of the column means; (3) the within-dyad correlation. The blue histograms
in Figure 2 represent the posterior predictive distribution from the MCMC inference, which are to be
compared with the vertical red lines representing the values of the statistics on the observed network. The
figure shows a good fit of the model, with the observed statistics lying at the centre of the corresponding
posterior distributions from the model.
6 The impact of the cooperation on the hospital quality
As explained in the introduction we assume that cooperation between hospitals may have a positive,
negative or null effect on overall quality in a healthcare system. In our study, quality is measured in terms
of both mortality and readmission, which are the most adopted outcomes in the healthcare literature in
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Table 3: Posterior means of estimates and standard deviations for the model of patient transfers in Equa-
tion (1). Signficance *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1
Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) -12.931*** 3.147
Distance -0.070*** 0.002
Co-membership 1.787*** 0.081
Origin
Hospital Discharges 0.075*** 0.016
DRG Weight -0.012 0.442
Age 0.026 0.019
Female -0.804 1.053
Degree Centrality 0.059*** 0.004
Betweenness -0.678 0.567
Teaching Hospital 0.075 0.222
Monospecialized Hospital -0.373 0.290
Technological Hospital 0.887*** 0.203
Public vs Private 0.681** 0.209
Risk-Adj. Mortality -0.035 0.025
Risk-Adj. 45-days Readmissions 0.033 0.028
Beds Saturation 0.023*** 0.006
Beds Turnover 0.009 0.011
Destination
Hospital Discharges 0.088*** 0.017
DRG Weight 1.199** 0.474
Age -0.035* 0.019
Female -1.831* 1.106
Degree Centrality 0.046*** 0.004
Betweenness 0.449 0.580
Teaching Hospital 0.536** 0.230
Monospecialized Hospital 0.328 0.312
Technological Hospital 0.918*** 0.205
Public vs Private 0.288 0.213
Risk-Adj. Mortality 0.034 0.027
Risk-Adj. 45-days Readmissions 0.026 0.028
Beds Saturation 0.026*** 0.007
Beds Turnover -0.003 0.011
σ2a 0.544 0.102
σab 0.362 0.086
σ2b 0.616 0.114
σ2ν 1.961 0.097
ρ 0.886 0.016
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order to evaluate the hospital effectiveness. Mortality is defined by a variable assuming value 1 if the
patient dies in hospital or within 30 days after the discharge, and 0 otherwise, whereas readmission is
measured by a binary variable equal to 1 if the patient is readmitted to the same hospital or to another
hospital within 45 days from a discharge and for the same clinical condition.
Using the model described in the previous section (Equation (1)) we obtain the predicted transfers, T̂ij ,
which, are now predicted from a set of covariates not related to the hospital quality. In addition, in
order to avoid further problems of endogeneity, T̂ij is calculated excluding the hospital random effects
because these can be related with characteristics such as the teaching status or the hospital specialisation
(cardiological hospital, neurological hospital, etc), which can affect hospital quality. We then relate these
predicted transfers with the overall quality for the hospitals i and j, which we measure by
Wij = Wi +Wj , (2)
when Wi and Wj represent the mortality/readmission of the pair of hospitals i and j, respectively. We
decided to adopt a measure of overall quality instead of a measure of mortality or readmissions split
by both sender and receiver hospitals because we are interested in estimating the impact of cooperation
on the overall quality of the healthcare system. In fact, if a hospital sends a patient with a very high
risk of mortality or readmission to another hospital and the patient dies or is thereafter readmitted, this
increases the mortality and the readmission rate of the receiver but does not impact on the quality of the
pair, since the patient would have most likely died or been readmitted in the hospital from which he/she
was transferred. Considering the overall mortality and readmissions allows us to take into account the
effect of the cooperation between hospitals on the overall quality of both the sender and receiver hospitals,
which is at its lowest when both outcomes are being reduced.
Since the dependent variable Wij defined in Equation (2) is also in the form of counts, we model Wij via
an over-dispersed Poisson mixed effect model similar to that used in the previous section:
E(Wij |·) = exp(α+ ξT̂ij + βHDij + θOWNij + δAij + ψFij + φDWij+
+ ϑTeachij + λMonoij + %Technoij + ui + uj + εij), (3)
where uk ∼ N(0, σ2u), j = 1, . . . , N is the hospital random effect which is now drawn from the same
distribution for the origin and destination hospitals, since Wij is symmetric, and εij ∼ N(0, σ2ε). As
expressed for the model in Equation (1), the parameter σ2ε captures a potential over-dispersion in the
conditional distribution of the dependent variable.
The coefficient ξ in Equation (3) is of interest in order to assess the impact of cooperation on hospital
quality. The model is also scaled by the overall discharges of the hospitals’ pair (HD), now taken as
the average of the discharges between the two corresponding hospitals since the dependent variable is
symmetric, as well as by a number of other variables typically used in healthcare evaluations (Berta
et al., 2016; Peluso et al., 2016; Berta et al., 2013; Mascia et al., 2015). In particular, we consider the
patient age (A), the DRG weight (DW ) and gender (F ), all calculated as averages of the two connected
hospitals. Moreover, we consider the hospital ownership (OWN ), which is defined as a dyadic variable
taking values public-public, private-private, public-private, respectively. Similarly, we also include dyadic
covariates to control for the teaching status of the hospital pair (Teach), their status as monospecialized
or general hospitals (Mono), and their status as technological hospitals (Techno). As with ownership,
these variables are defined as categorical variables, taking three possible values.
Table 4 shows the results of the model described in Equation (3) using the same MCMC settings as those
used for Model (1). These results form the core of the paper, where we analyze the effect of cooperation
between hospitals on the quality of the healthcare system. The analysis shows a negative and significant
effect for the predicted transfers on the health outcomes, for both mortality and readmissions. This means
that the higher is the cooperation between a pair of hospitals the higher is the quality for the two associated
hospitals, thus suggesting a positive impact of inter-organizational cooperation to the healthcare system.
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Table 4: Modelling the effect of the network of patient flows on the risk-adjusted mortality of the
healthcare system.
Mortality Readmission
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
(Intercept) 1.689 1.039 5.830*** 0.913
Hospital Discharges (HD) 0.084*** 0.006 0.089*** 0.007
DRG Weight (DW) 0.521** 0.173 0.666*** 0.183
Age (A) 0.017*** 0.005 -0.010** 0.005
Female (F) 0.512 0.402 -0.041 0.358
T̂ij -0.012*** 0.003 -0.013*** 0.003
Private and Private -0.772*** 0.155 -0.460* 0.267
Public and Private -0.293*** 0.078 -0.174 0.134
Technological and Technological -0.293*** 0.078 -0.174 0.134
Technological and Not Technological -0.564*** 0.011 -0.613*** 0.009
Teaching and Teaching 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004
Teaching and Not Teaching -0.010 0.020 -0.111*** 0.015
Monospecialized and Monospecialized -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.004
Monospecialized and General -0.341*** 0.043 0.004 0.032
σ2u 0.116 0.013 0.065 0.008
σ2ε 0.074 0.004 0.055 0.002
In particular, the parameters for the predicted transfers indicate that an increase of one patient transfer
produces a reduction of 1.9% in the average mortality and of 2.2% in readmissions. Finally, Figure 3
shows a good fit of the models, both for the case of mortality and readmission, with a good match between
observed and predicted summary statistics.
As a final step in the analysis, and considering some differences that were previously observed between
private and public hospitals, we investigate whether the impact of cooperation on quality is different ac-
cording to hospital ownership. To this aim, we add to Equation (3) an interaction term between predicted
transfers and the hospital ownerships. The results of this analysis are presented visually in Figure 4 and
Figure 5, for mortality and readmissions respectively. In both figures, the heatmaps on the left represent
the observed transfers between hospitals’ pairs sharing the same ownership (private vs private on top and
public vs public at the bottom), whereas the heatmaps on the right show the expected mortality predicted
from the model in Equation (3), scaled by the number of discharges of the hospitals’ pairs. We observe
from both analyses how public hospitals are more engaged in cooperation than private ones, and how, in
both cases, cooperation is effective in improving quality, i.e. in reducing mortality and readmission.
7 Discussion
Managers from different hospitals may decide to cooperate when treating a patient. Although we recog-
nise that there exist different channels of cooperation, in this paper we focus on the transfers of patients
between hospitals. We explore the impact on patient transfers between hospitals (cooperation/network)
of a set of demand-supply factors, distance-based centrality measures that account for spatial correlation
in the data, as well as measures of quality. Our results confirm existing findings that geographical dis-
tance plays an important role in explaining cooperation between managers: ceteris paribus the shorter
the distance between hospitals, the higher is the number of transfers. This result was confirmed by the
identification of communities in the network of transfers that have a clear geographical nature. In addi-
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Figure 3: Posterior predictive goodness of fit for the model in equation (3).
Mortality
Row Effect
352.5 353.0 353.5 354.0 354.5
Readmissions
Row Effect
849.5 850.0 850.5 851.0 851.5 852.0
tion, we find that geographical centrality helps in explaining the flows of transfers: holding all the other
variables constant, the higher the number of opportunities where to send/receive patients, the higher is
the number of patients transferred to/received by a specific hospital. Finally, we find that the intensity of
cooperation between hospitals does not depend on hospital quality. This results proves that in a healthcare
system where information on the distribution of hospital quality is not provided, managers may exploit
insight information, or have a perception of quality, in order to engage in cooperative behaviors with other
hospitals.
We then used this framework to assess, in the second stage, how such cooperation is related to the overall
clinical quality for the hospital of origin and of destination of the patient transfer. One main challenge,
when studying this relation, is the potential endogeneity between transfers and quality, since as we have
shown in the first analysis, the decision of transferring a patient to a specific hospital is informed, among
other things, by variables possibly correlated to the destination and origin hospital quality. For this reason,
we have also derived an exogenous measure of transfers (cooperation) to then being able to quantify its
effect on the quality of the healthcare system. When taking care of the endogeneity of cooperation, we find
a positive relationship between hospital cooperation and the overall quality of the connected hospitals.
This is the case both for private and public hospitals, though it is found to be more pronounced for public
hospitals.
The absence of a source of information on the quality of hospitals accessible to all providers, such as
in the form of star ratings, may prevent some hospitals to engage with others, with some missing the
opportunity to cooperate with higher quality hospitals. This may result in a lower degree of cooperation
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Figure 4: The effect of patient transfers on the predicted overall mortality. The hospitals in the heatmaps
are sorted by the number of discharges and the shade of colors is defined in the log-scale, except for the
null transfers where the points are white.
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Figure 5: The effect of patient transfers on the predicted overall readmission. The hospitals in the
heatmaps are sorted by the number of discharges and the shade of colors of the points is defined in
the log-scale, except for the null transfers where the points are white.
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among hospitals and a loss of overall quality. However, this asymmetric information may also prevent
patients to choose high quality providers (Berta et al., 2016). In other words, we would have expected a
reduction in the transfers between hospitals, had the patients known where to be hospitalized in the first
instance. Thus, the transfers of patients can be seen as an informal mechanism in the market to adjust
ex-post for such distortion. However, even in the absence of asymmetric information of the distribution
of hospital quality, given that some patients will not be able to choose the hospital where to be admitted
to (e.g. the urgent cases), effective cooperation between hospitals may prove crucial in increasing the
likelihood of survival for patients. In this case, policy makers (the Lombardy Region) could design a
dataset for matching between providers in order to make cooperation more prompt and effective.
Future work is needed in order to better assess the impact of hospital cooperation on quality. For instance,
within the category of private hospitals there are for-profit and not for-profit organizations, with the latter
being closer to the mission of the public sector. For this reason, future work should investigate whether
this result will still hold when considering for-profit hospitals Moreover, future work should also explore
different ways to measure the degree of cooperation between healthcare providers. For example, it could
be of interest to measure cooperation by the scientific collaboration among professionals in different hos-
pitals, which can be derived by the scientific works published jointly by physicians operating in different
hospitals.
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